Adversarial Defense by Latent Style Transformations by Wang, Shuo et al.
Adversarial Defense by Latent Style Transformations
Shuo Wang
CSIRO’s Data61 & Monash
University
Melbourne, Australia
shuo.wang@csiro.au/monash.edu
Surya Nepal
CSIRO’s Data61
Sydney, Australia
Surya.Nepal@data61.csiro.au
Marthie Grobler
CSIRO’s Data61
Melbourne, Australia
Marthie.Grobler@data61.csiro.au
Carsten Rudolph
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
carsten.rudolph@monash.edu
Tianle Chen
Monash University
Melbourne, Australia
tche119@student.monash.edu
Shangyu Chen
University of Melbourne
Melbourne, Australia
shangyuc@student.unimelb.edu.au
ABSTRACT
Machine learning models have demonstrated vulnerability
to adversarial attacks, more specifically misclassification of
adversarial examples. In this paper, we investigate an attack-
agnostic defense against adversarial attacks on high-resolution
images by detecting suspicious inputs. The intuition behind
our approach is that the essential characteristics of a normal
image are generally consistent with non-essential style trans-
formations, e.g., slightly changing the facial expression of hu-
man portraits. In contrast, adversarial examples are generally
sensitive to such transformations. In our approach to detect
adversarial instances, we propose an inVertible Autoencoder
based on the StyleGAN2 generator via Adversarial train-
ing (VASA) to inverse images to disentangled latent codes
that reveal hierarchical styles. We then build a set of edited
copies with non-essential style transformations by performing
latent shifting and reconstruction, based on the correspon-
dences between latent codes and style transformations. The
classification-based consistency of these edited copies is used
to distinguish adversarial instances. Our experiments on three
datasets, including 1024×1024 high-resolution images, show
that our defense can detect 90% to 100% of adversarial exam-
ples produced by various state-of-the-art adversarial attacks.
Besides, the false-positive error is further reduced by the
reconstruction of VASA.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has impressive performance in many applica-
tion domains, such as face and voice recognition, self-driving
vehicles, robotics, machine-based natural language communi-
cation, and games. However, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
have demonstrated vulnerability to adversarial attacks, specif-
ically, misclassification of adversarial examples. Attackers can
generate adversarial examples by adding small crafted indis-
tinguishable perturbations to legitimate examples [9].
To enhance the robustness of DNN models against adver-
sarial attacks, detecting methods (including methods such
as Defense-GAN [24], MagNet [18], FBGAN [1] and Image
Transformation-based detection [28]) have been shown to be
effective, without involving either the modification of the
protected classifier or requiring the knowledge of the process
to generate adversarial examples. However, most of the ex-
isting methods suffer from two significant limitations. First,
the reconstructive or generative ability of existing detection
based defense methods is limited, and few studies have been
done in the high-resolution scenario. Second, most of the
detection methods are carried out in the input space, e.g., fo-
cusing on pixel-wise reconstruction error. However, legitimate
examples are often corrupted with noise and have complex
distributions for high-resolution images, and the pixel-wise
reconstruction error of the adversarial examples derived from
strong attacks (such as the CW attack [4]) is very likely
similar to legitimate images. Therefore, pixel-wise detection
may mislead the detection of adversarial examples, which
would increase the rate of false positives.
In this paper, we propose an attack-agnostic defense scheme
against various adversarial examples based on the detection of
non-essential style transformations generated by latent shift-
ing and reconstruction. The intuition behind our approach
is that the essential characteristics of a legitimate image are
generally resistant to image transformations on non-essential
styles. For example, the identification classification results on
a human portrait image and its transformations with slight
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changes of facial expression are generally consistent. In con-
trast, adversarial examples are sensitive to such changes since
the unstructured adversarial perturbation does not follow
the correct distribution, which may affect the consistency of
essential characteristics. Considering human portraits again,
the identification classification results on an attacked human
portrait image and its transformations with slight changes of
facial expression would be different (inconsistent). Namely,
the adversarial perturbation would cause unpredictable dis-
tortion on the image transformations.
Non-essential style transformations of human portraits
include semantic features that do not affect the perception of
the image after slightly changing, such as the facial expression,
stubble, or facial orientation angles. To feasibly conduct
the non-essential style transformations on high-resolution
images, we propose the inVertible Autoencoder based on
the StyleGAN2 generator via Adversarial training (VASA).
VASA inverts images into disentangled latent codes that
reveal hierarchical styles. Then we find the correspondences
between the non-essential styles and disentangled latent codes.
A set of edited copies with non-essential style transformation
are generated via latent shifting on the latent codes along
the direction towards non-essential style change, e.g., smiling
expression. Figure 1 (a) shows the edited copies of non-
essential transformations for the same face image, including
facial orientation angle, eye-opening state, and a smiling
expression. We also demonstrate the edited copies on LSUN
cat (color of fur) and car (style of the headlight) images in
Figure 1 (d). Then, the consistency of classification results
between an image and its edited copies with non-essential
style transformation is used to detect suspicious inputs. This
defeats various state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on high-
resolution images. To the best of our knowledge, the VASA
defense is the first attempt to apply disentangled latent
representation to effectively defend against various adversarial
attacks in a single task in the high-resolution scenarios.
We demonstrate the latent shifting and reconstruction of
VASA and the corresponding defense in Figure 1 (b) and
(c), respectively. We utilize the encoder of VASA to map the
image to the latent codes of the styleGAN2 generator via
adversarial learning. The inverted latent codes are specialized
to hierarchical and disentangled style latent codes 𝑤. Next,
we find the correspondences between some non-essential styles
and latent codes, such as the smiling style direction recognized
in the third sub-figure of Figure 1(b), or the thickness of hand-
written digits in Figure 1 (c). Then, we make some slight
shifts on the inverted latent codes along the specific style
direction and reconstruct the shifted latent codes using the
generator, resulting in a set of edited copies with non-essential
style transformations.
We find that the small latent shifting along the non-
essential style has a slight impact on the identification of
edited copies for legitimate inputs, in terms of the classification-
based consistency between before and after transformations.
As demonstrated in Figure 1 (c), the classification results of
legitimate instances are consistent to its edited copies with
non-essential style transformations. In contrast, the unstruc-
tured adversarial perturbation cannot follow the manifold
of legitimate examples, which may augment the unexpected
distortion of the edited copies. Namely, the identification of
the adversarial input would not be consistent to its edited
copies with non-essential style transformations. Hence, it is
feasible to decide a consistency threshold or train a classifier
that easily distinguishes legitimate and adversarial images.
Our experiments on three datasets, including 1024×1024
high-resolution face images, show that our defense can detect
90% to 100% of adversarial examples produced by different
state-of-the-art adversarial attacks.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Adversarial attacks
Evasion attacks have long been studied on machine learning
classifiers [2, 16], and are practical against many types of
models [3]. These evasion attacks over neural networks are
referred to as adversarial examples [27]. For a given input
sample 𝑥, the adversarial example would be a sample 𝑥′ that
is similar to 𝑥 (according to particular measure metrics) and
leading to the classifier’s decision 𝐶𝑥 , 𝐶𝑥′ [3]. A classifier
can misclassify an adversarial example for two reasons. (1)
The adversarial example is far from the boundary of the
manifold of the task. For example, the task is a hand-written
digit classification, and the adversarial example is an image
containing no digit, but the classifier has no option to reject
this example and is forced to output a class label. (2) The
adversarial example is close to the boundary of the manifold.
If the classifier poorly generalizes the manifold in the vicinity
of the adversarial example, then the misclassification occurs.
Let U be the set of all instances in the sample space. A clas-
sification function is denoted by 𝐶, which outputs for each in-
stance 𝑥 ∈ U, a predicted class 𝐶𝑥 = 𝑦. Let Y = {𝑦1, · · · , 𝑦𝑚}
denote the set of classes for a certain classification task. Each
classification function assumes a data generation process that
produces each instance 𝑥 ∈ U with probability 𝑝𝑥. Let N
be a manifold that consists of instances that act naturally
with regard to a certain classification task, following a data
generation process. N can be approximated by a set of nat-
ural instances for a classification task [18]. The goal of the
adversarial example is to find a certain perturbation on 𝑥
to generate an adversarial example 𝑥* ∈ U ∖ N that fools a
specific 𝐶 to misclassify, i.e. 𝐶𝑥* , 𝐶𝑥. The adversary is
assumed to have the knowledge of the original classifier but
is not aware of the detector and purifier. Therefore, the goal
of the adversary is only to fool the unsecured classifier.
2.2 Adversarial defenses
Defense on neural networks is much harder than attacking
them.We summarize some ideas of current approaches to
defense and compare them to our work.
2.2.1 Adversarial training. One idea of defending against ad-
versarial examples is to train a better classifier [25]. An
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(a) Illustration of style transformation on FFHQ face image. Top row: horizontal angle. Middle row: eye opening
state. Bottom row: smiling expression.
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(b) Illustration of latent shifting and reconstruction. The red line is the decision boundary of two classes (White and
Black dots). The black rectangle is the adversarial example for the white dot.
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(c) Demonstration of our defense using hand-written digits.
(d) Illustration of style transformation on LSUN (cat and car).
Figure 1: Illustration of the non-essential style transformations and VASA-defense.
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intuitive way to build a robust classifier is to include adver-
sarial information in the training process, which we refer to
as adversarial training. For example, one may use a mixture
of legitimate and adversarial examples in training set for data
augmentation [27], or mix the adversarial objective with the
classification objective as regularizer [9]. Although this idea is
promising, it is hard to explain what attacks to train on and
how vital the adversarial component should be. Currently,
these questions are still unanswered.
2.2.2 Defensive distillation. In defensive distillation [21] the
classifier is trained in a certain way such that it is nearly
impossible for gradient-based attacks to generate adversarial
examples directly on the network. This method leverages
distillation training techniques [11] and hides the gradient
between the pre-softmax layer (logits) and softmax outputs.
However, this method can bypass the defense by adopting one
of the three following strategies: (1) choose a more appropriate
loss function, (2) calculate the gradient directly from the pre-
softmax layer instead of from the post-softmax layer, (3)
attack an easy-to-attack network first and then transfer to
the distilled network [5].
2.2.3 Detecting adversarial examples. The detection-based
defense against adversarial examples for a classifier 𝐶 aims
to establish a detector 𝑑𝐶 : U→ Y ∪ {𝐽}. 𝐽 is the judgment
that the input is unlikely from the manifold of the normal
instances. Further, the reconstruction of the defense can also
be considered as a purifier, in order to move adversarial
examples towards the manifold of normal examples. The
defense aims to increase the accuracy of the classifier with
the presence of adversarial examples by detecting the input
as an adversarial example or a normal image while rejecting
suspicious instances with huge distortion. One strong defense
is to detect adversarial examples with hand-crafted statistical
features [10] or separate classification networks [19]. For each
attack generating method considered, it constructs a DNN
classifier (detector) to tell whether an input is normal or
adversarial. The detector is directly trained on both normal
and adversarial examples. The detector shows good perfor-
mance when the training and testing attack examples are
generated from the same process, and the perturbation is
large enough, but it does not generalize well across different
attack parameters and attack generation processes.
3 VASA-DEFENSE VIA LATENT SHIFTING
AND RECONSTRUCTION
3.1 VASA-Defense overview
We propose VASA-Defense, a framework for defending attack-
agnostic adversarial examples of high-resolution images via
detection. This framework addresses three key challenges:
(C1) How to invert high-resolution image to hierarchical and
disentangled latent representation codes? (C2) How to link the
latent codes shifting with non-essential styles together and con-
struct edited copies with non-essential style transformations
in an efficient manner? (C3) How can the discrimination
ability of the detector be enhanced?
To address these three challenges, VASA-Defense is com-
posed of three components: (1) Hierarchical and disentangled
latent representing and inverting. (2) Latent shifting and re-
construction based edited copies generation. (3) Consistency
based detection. Details of these components are presented in
the following sections.
3.2 Hierarchical and disentangled latent
representing and inverting.
3.2.1 Architecture of VASA. To address challenge C1, we
propose a VASA model to map the high-resolution image
to the latent codes of a strong generative model with fine
reconstruction quality. Specifically, we leverage the generative
power of the state-of-the-art styleGAN2 [13] and propose an
inverse mapping strategy via adversarial learning to build an
autoencoder scheme. The encoder of VASA can invert the im-
age to the hierarchical and disentangled latent representation
for styleGan2 that serve as decoder for the reconstruction
of modified latent codes. The overall model is depicted in
Figure 2.
In addition to the generator G, D, and F from the standard
styleGAN2 framework, VASA includes an encoder E, which
maps data 𝑥 to latent representations 𝐸𝑥 = 𝑤′. Each module
D, G, F and E implements a parametric function (with
parameters 𝜃𝐷,𝜃𝐺, 𝜃𝐹 and 𝜃𝐸 , respectively).
Latent space 𝑤 has the same role as the intermediate latent
space in styleGAN2. Therefore, the G and F networks become
part of StyleGAN2. F is used to map z to latent space 𝑤 for
feasible disentanglement. The generator G utilizes 8 levels
resolutions, i.e., from 4× 4, 8× 8 to 1024× 1024, to reveal
different level of abstraction of style information, used to
learn spatially invariant style 𝑦 = 𝑦𝑠,𝑖, 𝑦𝑏,𝑖. G consists of 18
layers, two layers for each level of resolution. For instance, the
first four layers (4 and 8 resolutions) reveal the facial shape
or pose, and the middle four layers (16 and 32 resolutions)
describe the facial details, e.g., eyes, nose and mouth details,
and expression. The rest layers illustrate color and other
detailed features.
Learned affine transformation A is used to specialize w
to style information at each layer, namely scaled 𝑦𝑠,𝑖 and
biased 𝑦𝑏,𝑖 scalar components that control adaptive instance
normalization (AdaIN, i.e. modulation operation, Mod) on
feature map 𝑥𝑖 after normalizing each convolution layer.
𝐴𝑑𝑎𝐼𝑁𝑥𝑖, 𝑦 = 𝑦𝑠,𝑖
𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇𝑥𝑖
𝜎𝑥𝑖
+ 𝑦𝑏,𝑖 (1)
Namely, A learns the spatially invariant styles, scaled 𝑦𝑠,𝑖
and biased 𝑦𝑏,𝑖 scalar components from 𝑤, that are then
applied to the normalization of every layer of G. B is used to
introduce explicit noise inputs to generate more stochastic
details. The set of 𝑏 is single-channel images consisting of
uncorrelated Gaussian noise, fed into the feature map of each
layer of G. The noise image is broadcasted to all feature
maps using learned per-feature scaling factors (similar as
AdaIN) and then added to the output of the corresponding
convolution. To improve the G, similarly to [13], the set of
styles that are inputs to the revisited Instance Normalization
Adversarial Defense by Latent Style Transformations Woodstock ’18, June 03–05, 2018, Woodstock, NY
(a) Scheme of VASA. (b) Illustration of components.
Figure 2: Illustration of the VASA.
layers in G are related linearly to the latent variable 𝑤. The
normalization and modulation are operated on the standard
deviation alone. Besides, bias and noise operations are moved
outside the style block, where they operate on normalized
data. Skip connections are adopted instead of progressive
growing. Specifically, contributions of RGB outputs are un-
sampled and summed corresponding to different resolutions.
In the discriminator, the downsampled image is provided to
each resolution block of the discriminator. Bilinear filtering
is used in all up and downsampling operations.
We start from low-resolution images (4 × 4 pixels) and
progressively increase the resolution by smoothly blending
in new blocks to E and G. For the F and D networks, we
implement them using MLPs. The Z and W spaces and all F
and D layers have the same dimensionality in all our experi-
ments. F is designed to have eight layers, and we set D to
have three layers. For high-resolution images, e.g. 1024×1024
face images, the latent codes 𝑧 and 𝑤 are 512-dimensional
feature vectors.
The encoder E is the architecture, as illustrated in Figure
2 (b). As G is driven by a style input at every layer, E is de-
signed symmetrically, so that style information of the inverted
image can be extracted from a corresponding layer. Instance
Normalization (IN) layers are used to provide instance aver-
ages and standard deviations for every channel as extracted
style information of the inverted image, similar to [22]. If
𝑦𝐸𝑖 is the output of the i-th layer of E, the IN mod style at
that level provides instance averages and standard deviations
statistics 𝜇𝑦𝐸𝑖 and 𝜎𝑦
𝐸
𝑖 , revealing styles at every channel.
The IN module also provides the normalized version of the
input as output, which continues down the pipeline with
no more style information from that level. Styles output by
the encoder is combined to map them onto the latent space,
via the following multilinear map. Here, 𝐶𝑖s are learnable
parameters, and N is the number of layers.
𝑤 = 𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐶𝑖
[︂
𝜇𝑦𝐸𝑖
𝜎𝑦𝐸𝑖
]︂
(2)
3.2.2 Implementation. We train the VASA in an adversarial
manner and use a smooth version of the rectifier activation
function SoftPlus function [8], defined as 𝑓𝑡 = 𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔1+ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑡 in the loss function. We treat F as a deterministic
map from the pre-trained styleGAN2, therefore, the loss
function follows the BiGAN [6], given as follows:
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺,𝐸
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐷
E𝑥∼𝑝𝑥E𝑤∼𝑝𝐸·|𝑥 𝑙𝑜𝑔1−𝐷𝑥,𝑤
+E𝑤∼𝑝𝑤E𝑥∼𝑝𝐺·|𝑤 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑥,𝑤
(3)
To optimize the loss function, we use alternating updates.
Step I, the discriminator D and encoder E are updated. Step
II updates the generator G and F. Step III updates the latent
space autoencoder (i.e., networks G and E). For updating
the weights we use the Adam optimizer with 𝛽1 = 0.00 and
𝛽2 = 0.99. For non-growing architectures (i.e., MLPs of D
and F), we use a learning rate of 0.002, and a batch size of
128. For growing architectures (i.e., G and E), the learning
rate and batch size depending on the resolution. Typically,
the main loss function and regularization terms are optimized
simultaneously. We use the lazy regularization in the VASA
training, i.e., the regularization terms can be computed less
frequently than the main loss function, thus significantly
diminishing the computational cost and the memory usage.
Thus, regularization is performed only once every 16 mini-
batches.
3.3 Latent shifting and reconstruction based
edited copies generation
After the training of VASA, the inference can be conducted
as shown in Figure 2 (a). Given an underlying image 𝑥, we
first use the encoder of the pre-trained VASA to map a target
image, 𝑥, to the latent codes 𝐸𝑥 = 𝑤′. As the inverted image
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may not be from the training data for generator, therefore,
the 𝑤′ is fine-tuned to 𝑤* derived from the original generative
space of the generator G. Simultaneously, we aim to find a
suitable random noise map 𝑏′ added to each level feature
map to recover more stochastic-level details.
Further, we find the correspondences between the change
of latent codes and some selected non-essential styles. Addi-
tionally, we obtain a set of edited copies by conducting small
shifts on the inverted latent codes 𝑤* along the direction of
the change of selected non-essential styles and reconstruct the
shifted latent codes w^* = {𝑤*1 , 𝑤*2 , · · · , 𝑤*𝑚} by the generator
via 𝐺𝑤*𝑖 , 𝑏
′
𝑖.
3.3.1 Inverted latent code fine-tuning and noise embedding.
The trainable parameters for the fine-tuning are the com-
ponents of inverted latent codes, started at 𝑤0 = 𝐸𝑥 = 𝑤′,
as well as components in all noise maps 𝑏′𝑖 initialized to be
𝑁0, 𝐼. Latent fine-tuning searches for an optimized vector 𝑤*
that minimizes the loss function that measures the similarity
between the given image and the image generated using 𝑤*
and 𝑏′𝑖. The next step is to decide per-layer noise maps de-
noted 𝑏′𝑖 ∈ 𝑅𝑟𝑖×𝑟𝑖 where 𝑖 is the layer index and 𝑟𝑖 denotes
the resolution of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ noise map. The generator/encoder
in 1024 × 1024 resolution has 17 noise inputs, i.e., two for
each resolution from 8 × 8 to 1024 × 1024 pixels and one
more noise input added after the learned 4 × 4 pixels. We
compute 𝜇𝑤 = E𝑥𝐸𝑥 by encoding 10 000 random clean inputs
through the mapping network encoder at first. The scale of
𝑤 is approximated by computing 𝜎2𝑤 = E𝑥||𝐸𝑥− 𝜇𝑤||22 , i.e.,
the average square Euclidean distance to the center. Since
the computational graph for 𝐺𝑤 is given, 𝑤* and noise maps
can be calculated via gradient descent methods, taking the
gradient of G with regard to w and the noise maps. To evalu-
ate the similarity between the input image and the generated
image and regulation term of noise maps during optimization,
a loss function that is a weighted combination of the LPIPS
(Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity) [30] distances
loss, Mean Squared Error (MSE) loss and regularization term:
𝐿 = 𝜆𝑃𝐿𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑠𝐺𝑤
*, 𝑥 + 𝜆𝑀 ||𝐺𝑤* − 𝑥||22 + 𝛼
𝑖,𝑗
𝐿𝑖,𝑗 (4)
𝜆𝑃 = 𝜆𝑀 = 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 = 105 in all tests. N is the number of sam-
ples. The image quality term is the LPIPS distance between
target image x and the synthesized image. For increased
performance and stability, we downsample both images to
256× 256 resolution before computing the LPIPS distance.
Regularization of the noise maps is performed on multiple
resolution scales. Therefore, for each noise map greater than
8 × 8 in size, we form a pyramid down to 8 × 8 resolution
by averaging 2× 2 pixel neighborhoods and multiplying by
2 at each step to retain the expected unit variance. These
downsampled noise maps are used for regularization only and
have no part in synthesis.
The regularization term for noise map 𝑛𝑖,𝑗 is then where
the noise map is considered to wrap at the edges. The regu-
larization term 𝐿𝑖,𝑗 for the noise map 𝑛𝑖,𝑗 is thus the sum
of squares of the resolution-normalized autocorrelation coeffi-
cients at one pixel shifts horizontally and vertically, which
should be zero for a normally distributed signal. Let 𝑟𝑖,𝑗 be
the resolution of an original 𝑗 = 0 or downsampled 𝑗 > 0
noise map so that 𝑟𝑖,𝑗+1 = 𝑟𝑖,𝑗2 [13].
𝐿𝑖,𝑗 =
1
𝑟2𝑖,𝑗 𝑥,𝑦
𝑛𝑖,𝑗𝑥, 𝑦𝑛𝑖,𝑗𝑥− 1, 𝑦2
+
1
𝑟2𝑖,𝑗 𝑥,𝑦
𝑛𝑖,𝑗𝑥, 𝑦𝑛𝑖,𝑗𝑥, 𝑦 − 12
(5)
x and y can be the same image. We renormalize all noise maps
to zero mean and unit variance after each optimization step.
The optimization is run for 700 iterations using the Adam
optimizer with default parameters. The maximum learning
rate is 𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0.1, and it is ramped up from zero linearly
during the first 50 iterations and ramped down to zero using
a cosine schedule during the last 250 iterations. In the first
half of the optimization, Gaussian noise is added to 𝑤 when
evaluating the loss function as ?^? = 𝑤+𝑁0, 0.05×𝜎𝑤𝑡2, where
t goes from one to zero during the first half of the iterations.
This adds stochasticity to the optimization and stabilizes the
finding of the global optimum.
3.3.2 Latent and style mapping. To enable the style trans-
formations, the initial step is to find the correspondences
between the change of a specific style and the change of latent
space. It is feasible to obtain a well-labeled image dataset
from the public image cognitive service APIs, e.g., the labeled
face image recognized from the Azure Microsoft 1. There are
abundant labels available, including rotation angle, expres-
sion, glasses, etc. We can select one non-essential feature, such
as facial expression, and build a face image dataset with such
labels. We can then investigate the change of latent codes
when changing the selected styles (labels), such as expression.
The correspondence can be described using a direction vector
s, with the same dimensions with latent codes w. The simple
method to get s is as follows: taking two samples 𝑝 and 𝑞 at
each time, the approximate 𝑠 is the ratio via dividing the
difference of their latent codes 𝑤* by the difference of their
labels, and the final s can be considered as the average 𝑠 on
many sampling iterations. To further improve the efficiency
of the inference, we can take the median of the labels as the
dividing line, the labels lower than this value are changed to
0, and the labels higher than this value are changed to 1. By
applying logistic regression to solve the objective function of
a binary classification problem, 𝑤.𝑥 + 𝑏 = 𝑦, the obtained w
can be approximated as the direction vector s. Finally, the
edited copies can be obtained by adding different scale factors
(the magnitude of change) to the inverted and fine-tuned 𝑤*,
and then multiplying it by the direction vector s.
3.4 Consistency based detection
Using the edited copy with non-essential style transforma-
tions, we will find a detector that rejects instances that are far
from the normal manifold. The indicator of detection should
1https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/face/
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easily differentiate legitimate and adversarial instances. Fur-
ther, it should be attack-agnostic. We use the consistency of
classification between an image and its edited copies, eval-
uated by a pre-trained classifier, as the indicator for the
detection, instead of the element-wised reconstruction error.
The detector can be decided using a set of thresholds or us-
ing supervised learning techniques to distinguish adversarial
examples from normal images. Classification based consis-
tency is evaluated on the ratio of unchanged classification
prediction of these edited copies compared to that of the
underlying image. We find the consistency ability of normal
instances is significantly better (almost 100% consistent) than
that of adversarial ones (below 20%), as shown in Figure 1
(c) on MNIST and Figure 3 on high-resolution face images
from FFHQ. Therefore, it is feasible to use a threshold, such
as 20%, to decide whether it is normal or suspicious.
As all adversarial examples share certain inherent simi-
larities when putting under image transformations [4, 28],
another alternative method is to use a supervise discriminator
as a detector to distinguish clean and adversarial instance
using finite adversarial examples. In order to train the discrim-
inator, the first step is to generate a set of training instances.
To this end, a set of adversarial examples is generated using
various attack algorithms for each image in the training set
of the high-resolution face image. The target label of each
adversarial example is randomly selected (different from the
ground truth label of the original image).
The adversarial examples and original images are fed into
the detector, and a subset of images are selected, including
correctly identified legitimate images, labeled as valid (0),
and successfully attacking adversarial examples, labeled as
adversarial (1). Then, we generate the edited copies for each
image. Specifically, an image is first mapped to the latent
code by the encoder and then fine-tuned to 𝑤*. Finally, latent
shifting is conducted on the underlying image to generate its
𝑉 edited copies.
For each image, we feed its 𝑉 edited copies into a pre-
trained classifier and record the results, such as the classifier’s
output before the output layer (logits with length 𝐿𝑆). After
concatenating these 𝑉 logits, a vector of length 𝑉 ×𝐿𝑆 is used
to represent the image. These vectors are then adopted as the
training input for the discriminator. A multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) with ten layers is adopted as the discriminator for
detection.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Data and Setup
The performance of VASA-Defense is evaluated against the
state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on three datasets: MNIST
[15], LSUN car (resized to 512× 512) and cat (256× 256) [29],
and FFHQ [12, 13] (Face). Flickr-Faces-HQ (FFHQ) contains
70,000 high-quality images at 1024× 1024 resolution.
The adversaries are assumed to have no knowledge about
the classifier used for consistency evaluation for the detector
(black-box setting). They only focus on generating adversarial
examples that aim to maximize the prediction errors on a
target classifier. If we randomly choose the classifier used for
consistency evaluation or add randomness into the classifier
used for consistency evaluation, the detector could be applied
in a white or gray-box setting.
In all datasets, 20,000 clean examples are randomly se-
lected for training VASA. We randomly select 5,000 clean
images (named CLE, labeled 0) and generating 5,000 success-
fully attacked adversarial examples (named ADV, labeled 1),
respectively. These datasets are used to test the efficiency
of the VASA-Defense. A further 2,000 clean instances are
randomly chosen as the validation data (named VAL) to
decide thresholds or train the detector discriminator. The
attacked classifier for MNIST using the setting in [5] with
an accuracy of 99.4%. For the LSUN and FFHQ, we train a
classifier using the setting in [26] with an accuracy of 98.2%
and 94.7%.
We use the fast gradient sign method (e.g., FGSM [14]),
DeepFool (𝐿∞) [5, 20], 𝐿∞ Projected Gradient Descent At-
tack [17], Basic Iterative Method that minimizes the L2 and
𝐿∞ distances [14], Momentum Iterative Method attack [7]
and CW (𝐿2) attack [5, 20] for the experiments, implemented
using Fooling box [23]. We select 20-dimensional latent codes
to manipulate MNIST. The face and LSUN images will be
mapped into 18*512 feature maps. We generate 1000 edited
copies for each latent factor of the instance by conducting
latent shifting for 1000 times along a specific style direction.
The edited copies are fed into a pre-trained classifier, such
as VGG16 used in our test, to calculate the classification
consistency.
In the experiments, we find that the performance of the
threshold-based detector can achieve 99.9%. Therefore, we
skip the supervised methods. We decide the threshold of
classification-based consistency so that the detector’s false-
positive rate on the validation set VAL is at most 0.001
for all sleeted latent codes. This means that each detector
mistakenly rejects no more than 0.1% clean instances in
the validation set, i.e., 𝜌 = 99.9%. The bound of the latent
shifting also has an impact on the classification consistency
as well as detecting accuracy. In default, the bound is set as
the 𝜂 = 25% of the variance on clean validation data in our
experiments.
4.2 Defense evaluation against adversarial
attacks
4.2.1 Detection accuracy evaluation. Actually, the consis-
tency evaluation can be conducted on the edited copies via
latent shifting along various sets of style direction. For sim-
plicity, we only consider one style direction, and we find the
performance is well even in one style direction, as shown in
Figure 3. It is feasible to use a simple threshold to distinguish
clean and adversarial instances.
We demonstrate our defense on a high resolution face
image (1024 × 1024) using single style transformation and
threshold based detection. As shown in Figure 4, figures of the
first column are a clean image and its adversarial examples
derived from various attacks, with targeted misclassification
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Figure 3: Performance of threshold based detector on FFHQ
face images.
from class 0 to class 2, called underlying images. The rest
columns are edited copies with smiling style transformation
for each image in the first column.
The classification consistency of the legitimate (clean) im-
age is shown in the first row. All the edited copies have
the same classification result with the underlying legitimate
image. The images from the second row to the last row
demonstrate the classification consistency of different adver-
sarial examples. We can see from these figures that the edited
copies’ classification results are almost all different from their
underlying image. The perturbation to achieve adversarial
attacks drags the edited copies to an unexpected direction
while differing the underlying image. We also find some ad-
versarial examples can also be purified to the correct label (0)
via the reconstruction of VASE, such as all the edited copies
of basic iterative attacks in L2 and 𝐿∞ distances and part
of other attacks. The detection efficiency is also confirmed
using the LSUN cat (256*256) and car (512*512) in Figures
8 and 9 of the Appendix. We find that it is more feasible to
reconstruct the adversarial example to correct images for the
low-resolution images.
Next, we conduct consistency-based detection on the CLE
and ADV datasets, respectively. Adversarial examples are
recognized as 1, while normal examples are recognized as 0.
The adversarial detection accuracy (legend as ADV) is the
proportion of adversarial instances in ADV to be recognized
as adversarial, i.e., True-Positive. The clean detection accu-
racy (legend as Clean) is the proportion of clean instances in
CLE to be recognized as clean, i.e., True-Negative. The over-
all detection accuracy (legend as Overall) is the proportion
of all correctly detected instances in both ADV and CLE.
The attacking rate of various attacks and the detecting
accuracy over ADV using MNIST, LSUN cat and Face are
shown in Figure 5. Attacks include FGSM (𝐿∞ distance,
and 𝜖 = 0.005, 0025, 0.05 for MNIST, LSUN cat and Face,
respectively), Iterative attack (𝐿∞, 𝜖 = 0.01 and 𝐿2, 𝜖 =
0.5), Deepfool attack (𝐿∞) and CW attack (𝐿2) . The CW
attack has demonstrated as the most strong attack, with
100% attacking success rate for all types of images. The
adversarial detection accuracy of VASA-Defense on ADV
is near 100% for MNIST on all the attacks, including CW
attack (99.6% adversarial detection accuracy with 99.9%
correctly recognized clean instances when 𝜌 = 99.9%). Note
that we achieved such high accuracy without any adversarial
examples required and only based on the threshold that is
easy to be decided experimentally. For high-resolution face
images, the adversarial detection accuracy of VASA-Defense
on ADV is above 90% on all the attacks, including CW attack
(92% adversarial detection accuracy with 99.3% correctly
recognized clean instances when 𝜌 = 99.3%).
We also evaluate how the bound of latent shifting affects
consistency and detecting accuracy, as shown in Figure 6. We
observe that even for a small shifting bound, e.g., 𝜂 = 10%,
it can detect more than 85% adversarial examples, and re-
tain more than 99% clean instances correctly labeled, for
all types of images and evaluated attacks. As the bound in-
creases (larger 𝜂), it will cause the classification consistency
to drop for all the image sets (clean and adversarial), result-
ing in lower detecting accuracy (or attack success rate for
adversarial examples). However, the adversarial examples are
significantly more sensitive to rotation compared with the
normal image samples.
The False-Positive (FP) rate of normal instances increases
as the consistency threshold and adversarial detection accu-
racy rise. It is necessary to investigate how to balance the
adversarial detection accuracy and the FP rate. We find that
approximate 100% clean images incorrectly recognized as
adversarial can be purified back to the correct by the recon-
struction, based on the strong inverting and generative ability
of VAVE. Besides, some stochastic level features are retained
in the reconstructed images, due to the learned noise via in-
verted latent code fine-tuning and noise embedding (Section
3.3.1).
We illustrate the quality of the purified instances through
reconstruction by our VASA in Figure 7, and compare it with
ordinary encoding without noise embedding. We show the
purified images on the high-resolution face image from FFHQ
datasets. It reveals that samples reconstructed by our VASA
can retain more stochastic features compared to ordinary
encoding without noise embedding. It is demonstrated that
our noise embedding enables capturing more details during
reconstruction, such as the freckle, facial muscle lines, and
hairline in the last column of Figure 7. Therefore, our defense
has better generalization ability and can purify misjudged
clean instances, even some adversarial examples with small
distortions.
These results confirm that our VAVE-defense can efficiently
recognize adversarial examples. VAVE also can effectively
move the misjudged clean instances towards the normal man-
ifold, further reducing the false-positive error. Namely, the
VAVE-defense method can efficiently thwart adversarial ex-
amples while achieving a low FP rate.
4.2.2 Overall evaluation with comparisons. Table 1 shows the
effects of our defense against different adversarial attacks
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Figure 4: Demonstration of VASA-defense on various adversarial attacks.
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Figure 5: Attacking rate and detecting accuracy on various adversarial attacks.
on the MNIST and FFHQ, comparing with the state-of-the-
art defenses, e.g., MagNet, Defense-GAN, and FBGAN. On
a clean MNIST, without VASA-Defense, the accuracy of
the classifier is 99.4%; with VASA-Defense, the accuracy is
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Figure 7: Reconstruction quality illustration.
reduced to 98.3%. This small reduction is negligible. As illus-
trated in the table, the defense performance of VASA-Defense
has stronger defense abilities than MagNet and Defense-GAN.
Table 1 shows the performances of defense methods on the
MNIST and the Face datasets, respectively. As shown, the
performance of VASA-Defense exceeds that of MagNet on all
adversarial attacks (DeepFool and CW). VASA-Defense also
outperforms FB-GAN and Defense-GAN on the FGSM at-
tack. Overall, the VASA-Defense shows the best performance
against all evaluated attacks. These evaluations provide em-
pirical evidence that the VASA-Defense is effective, easy to
conduct, and generalizes well to different attacks.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose VASA-Defense, an attack-agnostic
defense that effectively detects various state-of-the-art ad-
versarial attacks. The intuition behind our approach is that
the essential characteristics of a normal image is generally
resistant to image transformations on non-essential styles. In
contrast, adversarial examples are sensitive to such changes
since the unstructured adversarial perturbation does not
follow the correct distribution. To feasibly conduct the non-
essential style transformations on high-resolution images, we
propose the VASA. VASA inverses images into disentan-
gled latent codes that reveal hierarchical styles. Then we
find the correspondences between the non-essential styles
and disentangled latent codes. A set of edited copies with
non-essential style transformation are generated via latent
shifting on the latent codes along the direction towards non-
essential style, e.g., smiling expression. Then, the consistency
of classification results on an image and its edited copies
with non-essential style transformation are used to detect
suspicious inputs. VASA-Defense achieves high detecting ac-
curacy against state-of-the-art attacks, especially for complex
images, delivering empirical evidence that our assumptions
are likely correct. Besides, we find that VASE’s strong recon-
struction ability could purify these misjudged clean instances
with good quality and reduce the false-positive error.
The experiments indicate that VASA can detect a variety
of adversarial examples with high accuracy. However, without
stronger justification or proof, we cannot dismiss the possi-
bility that there are future, currently unknown attacks that
thwart VASA’s reconstructive detection. We hope that our
findings would motivate further explorations on designing
more powerful attacks together with even more practical
anomaly detection.
In this work, the adversaries are assumed to have no knowl-
edge about the detector and purifier. Even if the attacker
knows everything else about the defense, such as network
structure, training set, and training procedure, the random-
ness derived from cryptography could be applied to guarantee
the computational difficulty for the attacker. Specifically, we
can generate a great number and large diversity of VAVE
candidates and randomly select one of these VAVEs for each
defensive device for every session, every test set, or even every
test example.
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Figure 8: Demonstration of VASA-defense on various adversarial attacks using LSUN car.
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Figure 9: Demonstration of VASA-defense on various adversarial attacks using LSUN cat.
